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Unrealistic Optimism in the Pursuit of Academic Success
Abstract
Although the ability to evaluate one’s own knowledge and performance is critical to learning, the correlation
between students’ self-evaluation and actual performance measures is modest at best. In this study we
examine the effect of offering extra credit for students’ accurate prediction (self-accuracy) of their
performance on four exams in two semester-long classes on Personality. The courses emphasized the role of
self-awareness. Despite these motivational interventions and performance feedback, there was minimal
change in accuracy over the semester; a large proportion of students remained unrealistically optimistic about
their performance in the face of evidence to the contrary. Moreover, inaccurately inflated confidence was
related to poorer academic performance. A small minority of students improved in accuracy and exam
performance over the each of the courses, offering a potentially useful source of comparison for addressing
unrealistic optimism. We discuss the findings as reflecting the powerful influence of protecting self-esteem and
suggest the need for realistic self-appraisal as a factor in academic success
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Although the ability to evaluate one’s own knowledge and performance is critical to learning, the correlation between 
students’ self-evaluation and actual performance measures is modest at best. In this study we examine the effect of 
offering extra credit for students’ accurate prediction (self-accuracy) of their performance on four exams in two 
semester-long classes on Personality. The courses emphasized the role of self-awareness. Despite these motivational 
interventions and performance feedback, there was minimal change in accuracy over the semester; a large proportion of 
students remained unrealistically optimistic about their performance in the face of evidence to the contrary. Moreover, 
inaccurately inflated confidence was related to poorer academic performance. A small minority of students improved in 
accuracy and exam performance over each of the courses, offering a potentially useful source of comparison for 
addressing unrealistic optimism. We discuss the findings as reflecting the powerful influence of protecting self-esteem and 
suggest the need for realistic self-appraisal as a factor in academic success
INTRODUCTION
Students often express surprise at their failure to meet academic 
goals. This sometimes leads to “perseverating to failure” as reflected 
in taking and failing the same class multiple times, complaints about 
instructors who do not reward effort alone, demoralization, and 
increased likelihood of attrition. Viewed by Miller and Wrosch (2007) 
as the cost of an excessively applied cultural imperative (“quitters 
never win and winners never quit”), a cognitive perspective suggests 
that there is something about information processing, specifically in 
the ability to evaluate one’s own performance, that interferes with 
student success (Robertson, Lewine and Sommers, 2014). 
Some argue that today’s college students, in contrast to 
those of past decades, have turned from the “self-examined life” 
to a consumer- and career-oriented approach to education that 
has undermined self-awareness in favor of pursuing practical 
knowledge (Delbanco, 2012). Dubbed “flawed self-assessment” 
by Dunning and colleagues (Dunning, Heath and Suls, 2004), there 
appear to be multiple obstacles to correctly reflecting on and 
evaluating one’s skills, behavior, and character. All of us are subject 
to confirmation bias, above average effects (the Lake Wobegon 
phenomenon- “…where all the women are strong, all the men are 
good looking, and all the children are above average…”, A Prairie 
Home Companion, 2016), excessive optimism, and other cognitive 
distortions that have practical consequences across a broad 
spectrum of life experiences, including education. As educators, we 
are naturally concerned with how such flawed self-assessment will 
affect student engagement and learning. It appears, as we briefly 
summarize below, that academic performance and accurate self-
assessment are related.
Since at least 1975 (Sinkavich), studies have suggested that 
students who do well academically are significantly more accurate 
in predicting and evaluating their academic performance than those 
who do poorly. In contrast, poor academic performance seems to 
be associated with an overly optimistic self-evaluation (Cochran & 
Spears, 1980; Hacker, Bol, Horgan and Rakow, 2000; Shaughnessy, 
1979). While consistently identified as an obstacle to learning, this 
unrealistic optimism among college students is not well understood, 
particularly regarding the role of motivation and affect.
We propose in this study to examine the role of motivation 
in unrealistic optimism by providing a strong immediate reward 
for accurate self-awareness: extra course credit. By offering extra 
credit (see below), we maximize students’ immediate performance 
gain in addition to the benefit to be derived over multiple exams 
and feedback opportunities.
Extra credit is a pervasive feature of contemporary higher 
education, albeit one about which many educators are ambivalent 
(Harrison, Meister and LeFevre, 2011; Hill, Paladino and Eison, 
1993; Lei, 2013; Norcross, Horrock and Strason, 1989). Reported 
to be used most often by better performing students and by 
female students, extra credit is viewed by faculty as both a means 
for students to deepen their level of understanding, as well as a 
means for improving grades. Students report that the opportunity 
to improve their grades is the strongest motivator for extra credit 
(Lei, 2013). It stands to reason, therefore, that offering extra credit 
for accurate self-evaluation of academic performance should 
encourage students to engage in the self-awareness process.
In addition to the extra credit, we maximized the exercise 
of academic self-evaluation by making self-awareness a focal point 
of each course and by assessing students’ accuracy of prediction 
over four exams administered during a single semester. In short, 
we attempted to maximize features of the courses that should have 
enhanced self-awareness.   
METHODS
Overall Design
To examine the effect of performance self-monitoring on exam 
grades, we asked students to predict their exam scores immediately 
prior to taking each exam. We calculated their accuracy of prediction 
and assessed the relationship between prediction accuracy and 
exam performance. In order to examine the role of extra credit in 
accuracy, we carried out the study in two different classes, one that 
offered extra credit for accuracy (incentivized manipulation) and 
one that offered no extra credit of any sort.
Courses
The one-semester courses were a mid-level undergraduate 
personality course (syllabus available from the first author) 
emphasizing the tension between the conscious and the modern 
unconscious (Kihlstrom, 1987) in the formation and expression of 
personality. This tension was modeled experientially using in class 
exercises and didactically by assigned readings representing a broad 
range of personality theories.
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Measures
Four 4-alternative forced choice exams worth a maximum of 20 
points each were administered during each course. Using predicted 
(P) and obtained (O) scores, we calculated an accuracy (A) score 
for each exam: [P-O]/[P+O]. In addition, we calculated a measure 
of accuracy (Ac) across the four exams: (Ac = [P1-O1+P2-O2+P3-
O3+P4-O4]/[P1+O1+P2+O2+P3+O3+P4+O4]) to determine 
predictor types and their relationship to final cumulative exam 
grades. Students with negative accuracy values underpredicted their 
exam grade; students with positive accuracy values overpredicted 
their exam grades; and those with accuracy scores of 0 predicted 
perfectly what they scored on the exam.
Participants
Students in two personality classes participated in predicting their 
exam scores. This was part of a larger study of critical thinking 
approved by the local IRB. This report is based on those students 
(from a total of 300) who consented to have their data analyzed and 
who completed all four exams required in the class (222 students; 
63 men, 149 women, 10 students did not indicate sex). 
Procedures
Prior to each exam, students were asked to submit a numerical 
prediction of their performance on that exam (0-20). In one class, 
students could receive up to 3 extra credit (EC) points on a given 
exam for accuracy of prediction (3 points for predicting accurately; 
2 points for being within 1 point; 1 point for being within 2 points). 
Students in the second course did not receive extra credit of 
any sort (NEC). Graded exams were returned to all students so 
they could see which items they missed as a way of improving 
their learning and predictions on subsequent exams (Hacker, Bol, 
Horgan et al., 2000). 
Analyses
We conducted three sets of analyses. First, we used paired 
comparisons of accuracy values for each exam to examine changes 
in accuracy that occurred over the course. Second, we calculated 
the correlations between predicted and obtained scores for each 
exam for direct comparison with previous studies (Dunning et al., 
2004). Third, we examined the mean cumulative exam score of 
each of the three predictor types (underpredictor; overpredictor; 
accurate) to determine if the types differed in level of performance 
as measured by final cumulative grade in the course.
RESULTS
Accuracy over exam administrations
 Mean (s.d.) accuracy values collapsed by extra credit status for 
the four exams were .05 (.12), .06 (.13), -.002 (.12), and .06 (.13) 
for exam 1, 2 3, and 4, respectively. Mean accuracy scores by extra 
credit status (EC and NEC) were: Exam 1 = .04 (.10) and .06 (.14); 
Exam 2 = .06 (.11) and .05 (.15); Exam 3 = -.001 (.09) and -.002 (.14); 
and Exam 4 = .03 (.11) and .09 (.15). A repeated measures ANOVA 
of Accuracy with Extra Credit Status and Sex as a between subjects 
main effect, revealed no significant effects of Extra Credit Status, 
Sex, or Extra Credit Status X Sex (p > .05). 
To explore the degree to which the individual performance 
reflected group performance, we calculated the percent of students 
who were most accurate in predicting Exam #3 (the exam with 
the highest overall accuracy for both classes). Half of the students 
(50%) were most accurate on Exam #3, consistent with the group 
data. There were, however, 48 students (21.6%) who were most 
accurate on Exam #4, exhibiting a systematic increase in accuracy 
over the four exams. Of the 48 students with highest accuracy for 
Exam #4, 14 (6.3% of all students) predicted exactly what they 
obtained on the last exam.
The correlations between predicted and obtained exam 
scores were modest, although statistically significant (p < .001) for 
each exam: .29, .29, .27, and .34 for exam 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 
Correlations between predicted and obtained exam scores by 
Extra Credit and No Extra Credit were: Exam 1 = .31 and .29; Exam 
2 = .37 and .22; Exam 3 = .30 and .24; and Exam 4 = .49 and .29. 
Although the correlations were consistently lower for the no extra 
credit condition, only the last difference between correlations was 
significant, p = .03 (one-tailed test), a possible chance finding given 
the number of correlations calculated. Analysis by sex yielded no 
statistically significant differences.
Accuracy and Final Grade
A one-way ANOVA (Accuracy Predictor Type) revealed a significant 
main effect (F2, 209 = 16.000, p <.001) on final mean cumulative 
exam grade. Overpredictors had a significantly lower mean 
(s.d.) grade, 52.7 (8.11) than accurate predictors, 58.4 (6.54) and 
underpredictors, 59.4 (6.7); p < .001); accurate and underpredictors 
were not significantly different from one another.
To determine if the availability of extra credit influenced 
prediction strategy, we examined the distribution of the predictor 
types as a function of extra credit availability (EC) and no extra 
credit (NEC). The distributions were very similar (differences were 
not statistically significant, p > .05) for the two conditions. EC: 
71.6%, 22.0%, and 6.4% were over, under, and accurate predictors, 
respectively; NEC:  69.9%, 25.2%, and 4.9% were over, under, and 
accurate predictors, respectively.
To compare our results with those reported by Hacker 
et al (2000), we divided students into five groups of academic 
performance level based on final cumulative exam score % 
(collapsed by course): Group 1 < 50% (n = 11); Group 2 = 50-59% 
(n = 24); Group 3 = 60-69% (n = 64); Group 4 = 70-79% (n = 74); 
and Group 5 = 80-100% (n = 27).  We then compared each group’s 
mean accuracy score for each of the four exams. The results appear 
in Table 1. The highest achieving students (Group 5) were clearly 
more accurate (closer to 0) than the other four groups on Exams 
#1, 2, and 4, with the final accuracy for the highest performing 
group being 60 times more accurate than the next most accurate 
group. Extra credit status did not significantly change the results.
Subjective Experiences of Students
The vast majority of student feedback about the courses was in 
the form of standard student ratings. There were five unsolicited, 
ad-lib comments, all positive with two directly addressing the use 
of performance prediction.
• “I feel like SAC [self-awareness credit] really helped me 
keep myself in check. It helped me get a more realistic 
idea of what my abilities are. And I would have to say 
that I personally applied the SAC point idea to my other 
courses when I took those exams as well. I have to say 
that I have done far better in my classes all around this 
semester”.
•  “I find the more I use this critical thinking tool the better 
I have become at the prediction.  I am not expecting one 
grade and getting another.  This has lowered my anxiety of 
[sic] disappointment”.  
DISCUSSION
Prediction of academic performance can become 
more accurate over a semester but not via use of 
extra credit
At the group level, there was some improvement in the ability 
to predict exam performance from the first to the third exam, 
with a drop in accuracy for the final exam for both courses. We 
do not know the mechanism underlying this change other than the 
individual feedback each student generated by comparing obtained 
with predicted grade, perhaps as informed by having the graded 
exams available. It appears that the mere act of requiring self-
evaluation, with no other discussion about how to predict grades 
and the meaning of accuracy/inaccuracy, may modestly improve 
prediction. This may be limited, however, as suggested by the return 
to a greater level of inaccuracy for exam 4. This could, of course, be 
a chance finding requiring further research to explore.
In our study, there were minimal differences in the accuracy 
of predicted exam scores, mean final grade, and distribution of 
accuracy scores between the class that received extra credit for 
accuracy of prediction and the class that did not. This raises the 
possibility that the prediction exercise is highly intrinsically driven 
for at least some of the students (as suggested by the spontaneous 
student feedback). It may also be that the conditions of this study 
were not optimal for improving self-evaluation, although we note 
that students received their graded exams for further study and that 
self-awareness was emphasized throughout the semester course. 
The one noteworthy exception is the better mean prediction 
accuracy of the poorest performing students when receiving 
extra credit (.08) than when not (.23). This is inconsistent with the 
generally held view that it is the better performing students who 
benefit most from extra credit and deserves more attention in the 
future.
Despite the use of extra credit and the semester-long 
emphasis on self-awareness, students’ accuracy regarding their own 
performance was modest at best, a finding consistent with reports 
by others. Dunning et al. (2004) in reviewing the correlation 
between self-reported skill/knowledge and actual performance 
among college students, reported an average correlation of about 
.21 (Hansford & Hattie, 1982). In a later, more intensive review, the 
correlation was around .39 (Falchikov & Boud, 1989, reported in 
Dunning et al., 2004). The correlations in our study ranged from .27 
to .34 suggesting a consistency in accuracy across some 30 years of 
research. In short, students’ ability to correctly evaluate their own 
knowledge and performance has remained remarkably consistent 
and low over time.
Persistence of optimistic predictions in the face of 
poor performance: motivational strategy?
While modest prediction accuracy can improve over time and 
effort, there is a substantial range of individual differences, with 
most students consistently overpredicting their success. Hacker et 
al. (2000) found that only the higher performing students (80% or 
higher on exams) were accurate in their predictions, predictions 
that improved over three exams. In contrast, poorer performing 
students (78% of their sample) consistently overpredicted their 
performance. Similarly, Falchikov and Boud (1989) found that 68% 
of students overestimated their performance. Our results, in which 
71% of our students overpredicted, are consistent with these earlier 
reports. Why do students persist in their overly optimistic view of 
their academic performance in the face of repeated evidence to 
the contrary?
One interpretation, pointed out in the Introduction, is that 
students are susceptible to cultural injunctions, such as “quitters 
never win and winners never quit.” As sung by Kenny Rogers, 
however, sometimes “you got to know when to fold ‘em” (Miller 
& Wrosch, 2007). Similarly, the combination of the positive 
psychology movement (Seligman, Ernst, Gillham, Reivich and 
Linkins, 2009) and the currently popular “flexible mind” injunction 
to educators (Dweck, 2006) may lead students to believe that 
persistent confidence in their own ability to do better will make 
it so. We frequently hear student services personnel and advisors 
tell students how they must believe in themselves, anyone can do 
anything if they put their minds to it, and all things are possible 
with persistent effort. The results from this study suggest we start 
a conversation about reducing potentially harmful overoptimism 
and increasing productive humility. Indeed, the recent success of 
vendors in offering predictive analytics algorithms to universities 
suggests that this movement may already be under way (Blumenstyk, 
2016; Young, 2016).
Overprediction was clearly associated with lower grades in 
this study, as reported by others (see Falchikov & Boud, 1989; 
Hacker et al., 2000). Our findings suggest further that it may not 
strictly be a cognitively driven flawed self assessment that is critical 
(in which case both under- and overprediction should be associated 
with similar grades), but rather the direction of inaccuracy. More 
precisely, unrealistic optimism may be serving to protect a poorer 
performing student’s self-esteem and prevent discouragement 
in the face of mediocre achievement. Put another way, accurate 
perception of reality may actually be depressing (the “sadder but 
wiser” phenomenon), while overoptimism keeps one going, at the 
risk of repeated failure. A counter-argument to this interpretation 
is found in the words of the student (cited above) who actually 
avoided negative affect (disappointment) by having a realistic view 
of how s/he would perform. This difference might be related to 
TABLE 1. Mean accuracy score for each exam by academic 
performance group (Perfect accuracy = 0.
     Academic Performance Group
Exam < 50% 50-59% 60-69% 70-79% 80-100%




















Exam #1: F4, 195 = 13.430, p <.001
Exam #2: F4, 195 =7.361, p <.001
Exam #3: F4, 195 = 2.913, p = .023




the degree to which different students actually experience negative 
affect after failure, independent of predictions: those who are 
accurate or underpredict may correctly anticipate more negative 
affect from failure more than those who overpredict, and therefore 
prefer to ward off disappointment proactively.
Perhaps the unrealistic optimists are those who experience 
and find intolerable the negative affect created when asked to focus 
on themselves, thereby interfering with test performance (Geller 
& Shaver, 1976). In addition, it is widely accepted that education, 
by asking students to re-examine their beliefs, consider alternative 
points of view, and push themselves beyond their comfort zones, 
demands that some tolerance of anxiety is required for true learning 
(Lyons, 2010; Roediger & Finn, 2009). Or maybe the overpredictors 
have a more casual investment in their academic performance. 
Future study incorporating measurement of affect will be required 
to address these issues.
On a more positive note, a small group of students 
systematically improved in prediction accuracy over the semester. 
In particular, those students who had the highest cumulative exam 
performance (see Table 1), unlike all other students, showed a 
linear improvement in accuracy unrelated to exam grades over the 
semester. This might suggest that grade prediction was one more 
academic task that the best students learned how to do.
In contrast, those students who continued to predict less 
accurately, largely in the overoptimistic direction, ended the 
semester with poorer exam scores than at the beginning. This 
presents a challenging paradox for instruction: some students (a 
small minority) seem to improve with a focus on anticipating their 
own performance, while a majority does worse. How accurate 
do the overly optimistic students believe they are being and with 
what confidence? How do they interpret their falling short? What 
changes in self-understanding (if any) occur for these students after 
an inaccurate prediction? Would explicit discussion about self-
evaluation improve academic performance? Might predictive analytic 
data mitigate student inaccuracy and offer students a better basis 
for making predictions and triaging their efforts and self-discipline? 
And what can we learn from the accurate predictors who improve 
in accuracy and academic performance over a semester that we 
might share with the majority who do not?  
There are two broad paradigms that we can adopt to 
explore these questions: cognitive style (Kozhevnikov, Evans and 
Kosslyn, 2014) and storytelling (Boje, 1991).”…[C]ognitive style 
represents adaptation to the external world that develops through 
interaction with the surrounding environment on the basis of 
specific cognitive abilities and personality traits” (Kozhevnikov et 
al., 2014, p. 21). Drawing on major contemporary theories and 
empirical research, these authors offer an integrated matrix that 
captures personality, learning styles, and information processing 
demands that could be used to carefully parse the demands of 
teaching goals and to explore suitable teaching strategies that take 
into account individual differences among students. An important 
feature of their model is that cognitive style is a dynamic process 
that reflects interaction between environmental demands (learning 
goals) and a broad array of individual differences in student learning 
approaches. Boje (1991), in contrast, suggests that organizations 
(including educational ones) rely on the use of group narrative to 
move toward the organization’s goals. As applied to the findings 
in our study, we might ask how faculty and students understand 
and describe the purpose of taking classes, the role of learning 
strategies, and how narratives differ among the participants in the 
educational effort. Both cognitive style and storytelling provide 
long-term perspectives to better understand unrealistic optimism 
in the classroom.
Finally, what is the role of affect, especially negative affect, in 
the use of self awareness strategies for learning? As pointed out 
by Brookfield (1987; 2002), successful teaching is more than just 
transferring a set of skills. The strategies for developing critical 
thinking skills, such as being asked to predict one’s own exam 
performance, can lead to anxiety or stress. This perspective 
suggests that we also examine the affective consequences of our 
pedagogical strategies and be prepared to address them. With 
respect to the unrealistic optimists, perhaps the core issue is not 
cognitive, but rather affect regulation, something to be examined in 
future research.
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